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Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4 
New Issues in the Study of Infant Categorization: 
A Reply to Husaim and Cohen* 
Deborah G. Kemler 
Swarthmore College 
Húsaim and Cohen's focus (Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1981, 27, 443-456) on 
the learning of ill-defined categories by infants is securely motivated. Still, 
some of the particular questions they pursue—namely, how many dimensions 
are used to form the categories and what is the salience hierarchy of the di 
mensions—are tricky and perhaps misleading. Underlying their design and 
analysis is the basic assumption that the dimensions or attributes of the stimulus 
as defined by the experimenter have psychological reality for the infants. This 
assumption is questioned. Infants may perceive different attributes in the 
stimulus or they may not articulate the stimulus into attributes at all. 
The insight that many natural categories are structured by 
family-resemblance relations rather than based on selected defining 
attributes has provided an important new perspective for the study 
of the categorization process. Husaim and Cohen's (1981) paper rep 
resents one of the pioneering efforts to investigate the process of 
forming ill-defined categories in human infants. Like most ground 
breaking efforts, the work raises at least as many questions and prob 
lems as it addresses. Accordingly, the primary purpose of my com 
ments will be to direct attention to some of the hidden assumptions 
and controversial lines of argument in the paper so as to make more 
explicit the issues that may frame future analyses and investigations. 
The motivation for studying infants' learning of ill-defined cate 
gories is uncontestable. Not only is it clear that many natural cate 
gories of human adults have a family-resemblance structure (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975), but it is also clear that such a structure is particularly 
characteristic of the categories that children name early in language 
acquisition (as opposed to many categories that reflect technical 
concepts, which have a defining-attribute structure, and which are 
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learned primarily at later developmental levels). It is certainly not 
difficult to believe that the processes that guide the acquisition of 
categories based on family resemblance may be different from the 
processes that guide the acquisition of categories based on selected 
defining attributes both because different formal models provide 
optimizing descriptions of the acquisition of these two types of cate 
gories and because, empirically, the acquisition of real-world cate 
gories based on the two structures occurs at least in part at different 
levels of development. If the acquisition of categories outside the 
laboratory is wholly or primarily the acquisition of family 
resemblance categories, then laboratory studies of infant categoriza 
tion should focus on these categories, as Husaim and Cohen do. 
Until recently, the laboratory study of categorization—across 
developmental levels—has been dominated by investigations of the 
acquisition of categories based on a small number of defining attrib 
utes, most frequently one. The acquisition of this type of concept 
has been the focus of the majority of theoretical efforts in the field. 
Thus, it is not surprising that some of the familiar questions that have 
framed theoretical controversies concerning the acquisition of well 
defined categories have reappeared in the new literature on the ac 
quisition of ill- defined or family-resemblance-based concepts. Such 
questions are major foci of Husaim and Cohen's paper — namely, 
how many dimensions are used (by infants) in categorization, and 
what is the salience hierarchy of the dimensions—the kinds of ques 
tions posed many times in the older literatures on attention in learn 
ing and on the nature of hypothesis-testing strategies (e.g., Trabasso 
& Bower, 1968). 
I will argue that these questions are not only trickier to answer 
than Husaim and Cohen's analysis suggests, but that they also might 
be misleading kinds of questions to pursue in the study of infant cat 
egorization. Both arguments center on the problem of assuming that 
the dimensions or attributes of the stimulus defined by the experi 
menter have psychological reality for the learner, in this case a 10 
month-old infant. One way such an assumption can be wrong is that 
the dimensions declared by the experimenter may be different from 
the dimensions perceived by the learner. This may be explicated 
simply by reference to Husaim and Cohen's stimuli, two of which are 
shown in their Figure 1. These authors consider there to be four vari 
able attributes in their drawings of fantastic animals—body size, neck 
length, leg length, and number of legs—each attribute having two 
values. However, equally plausible descriptions of the attribute 
structure of the stimulus set are easy to imagine: for example, three 
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attributes—body size, total height, and number ot legs—total 
height, having more than two values; or, for example, two attributes 
—body size and amount of contour in the appendages; or even, one 
multi-valued attribute—total amount of contour. 
On what basis can we assume that Husaim and Cohen's descrip 
tion is the psychologically appropriate one for their subjects? I be 
lieve there is more reason to doubt than to credit that assumption if 
only because an infinite number of descriptions are potential and 
many of them are plausible. Likely, a good deal of specific informa 
tion about the nature of animals is required before neck length and 
leg length would emerge as separate dimensions, more information 
than a 10-month old has. Nor does it seem more plausible that the 
infant treats number-of-legs separately from length-of-legs rather 
than perceiving them together as a more global attribute of total 
amount of contour. 
Actually, an inspection of the pattern of transfer responses to 
the test stimuli strongly suggests that the infants do not dimensional 
ize the stimuli in the same way as do Husaim and Cohen. Putting 
aside the responses to the prototypical stimuli, the most consistent 
pattern that I find in the transfer data is the tendency to categorize 
pairs of complementary stimuli in the same way. Specifically, the 
classification probabilities are remarkably similar within stimulus pair 
9 and 10, within stimulus pair 11 and 12, and within stimulus pair 13 
and 14, despite the fact that in all cases the stimuli within the pair 
share no values in common on the four attributes that the authors 
describe. Such a pattern is not only inconsistent with categorization 
based on a single attribute, as Husaim and Cohen emphasize, but it is 
also inconsistent with categorization based on a family resemblance 
structure no mattèr what the presumed underlying process is. That is 
why there is such a poor fit between the test data for these pairs and 
the predictions of the two models, independent-cue and context 
models, that provide plausible alternative accounts about how such a 
structure is acquired.1 Both models predict a negative correlation 
between classification probabilities for complementary test stimuli, 
given the symmetric nature of the acquisition set; both models pre 
dict that the classification probabilities for complementary stimuli 
sum to 1.0 under these conditions. Thus, we are either led to con 
clude that Husaim and Cohen's infants have transferred incoherently 
1. When the two prototypical stimuli (1111 and 0000) are omitted from the calcu 
lations, the two models only account respectively for 9% and 6% of the variance of 
the test-trial data. 
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or, more likely, that the authors have failed to describe their stimuli 
in a psychologically correct way.2 Needless to say, this is a trouble 
some conclusion as it not only undermines specific conclusions 
about how many attributes the infants attended to and what the rela 
tive saliences of the attributes were, but it goes to the very heart of 
the paradigm—the assertion that the acquisition exemplars are or 
ganized by family resemblance structures. It is possible to solve the 
original task on the basis of a single attribute, namely, total amount of 
ink (contour) in the stimulus, always greater for Category A exem 
plars than for Category Β exemplars (although, as far as I can tell this 
simple putative attribute is not sufficient to account for the confus 
ing transfer data).3 
If the correct definition of the stimulus is such a crucial issue for 
this type of work on categorization, is there any workable way to en 
sure it? The best I can do is suggest that its likelihood can be in 
creased by defining and varying attributes that have a primary psy 
chological status for human adults and that are independent of the 
meaning of the stimulus—attributes like size, color, and position of a 
single form. Since one limits considerably the choice of stimuli un 
der this requirement, an alternative approach to constructing ill 
defined categories is to find a stimulus set for which adults provide 
consensual judgments of the component attributes, to use these at 
tributes as the basis for forming categories structured by family re 
semblance relations, and to show that adults cannot find a simple 
definition based on some newly discovered attribute by which to 
identify the categories so constituted. The stimulus sets used by Hú 
saim and Cohen would at least fail the last criterion as adults would 
easily discover amount-of-contour as the single-attribute basis for 
differentiating categories. 
Now to a more radical and more subtle problem with the as 
sumption that the experimenter-defined dimensions are used by the 
infant learner. Recent work suggests that in cases where dimensions 
play a primary role in guiding perception and cognition for the adult 
and for the older child, they do not for the preschooler; instead, 
perception and cognition in the young child are organized around 
2. For example, if shape and size are more psychologically compelling dimen 
sions of a rectangle than length and width, then two stimuli complementary on height 
and width may well be treated the same way because they are the same size or the 
same shape. 
3. If the prototypes for the categories had been varied across subjects such that 
not all subjects' exemplars were based on the single pair 1111 and 0000, such an alter 
native account of the category structure would have been far more difficult to invent, 
even given the ambiguity of the correct stimulus description. 
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the overall similarity relations among the stimulus wholes rather than 
around selected dimensional components (e.g., Kemler, 1982; 
Shepp, 1978; Smith & Kemler, 1977). Extrapolating from the evi 
dence with the preschoolers, the hypothesis suggests the domi 
nance of overall similarity relations in infants. Consistent relations of 
overall similarity relations do not presuppose a dimensional basis— 
that is, knowledge of the overall similarity of multidimensional sti 
muli need not be computed from knowledge of component similar 
ities on the individual dimensions. It can be apprehended directly, 
just as the similarity of stimuli that vary unidimensionally can be ap 
prehended directly. In fact, for special multidimensional stimuli— 
called integral by Garner (e.g., 1974)—even adults apprehend simi 
larity relations more easily than component dimensional relations. 
Current developmental evidence suggests a useful analogy between 
the way young children generally perceive multidimensional stimuli 
and the way adults perceive special integral stimuli like color 
patches. 
The developmental evidence has general significance for the 
acquisition of category information for it suggests that young chil 
dren are especially well prepared to learn categories based on a fam 
ily resemblance structure and poorly prepared to learn categories in 
which one of a number of variable stimulus attributes is singled out 
as defining. This is because a strong family resemblance structure 
implies a strong similarity structure (on the average, high similarity of 
instances within categories, low similarity of instances in different 
categories), whereas a defining attribute criterion implies a rather 
poor similarity structure (e.g., high similarity of items in different cat 
egories). Accordingly, categories based on strong family resem 
blances should be more easily learned by human infants than those 
based on criterial attributes—a prediction in search of a test—be 
cause infants should be more attuned to overall relations of similarity 
than to component dimensions if the developmental hypothesis is 
correct. Such speculation invites further research, like Husaim and 
Cohen's, on infant learning of ill-defined categories. 
However, if the developmental hypothesis is correct and overall 
similarity relations dominate component dimensional relations in 
the infant, then questions such as how many dimensions can (does) 
the infant attend to and what is the relative salience of these dimen 
sions, may be misleading. The apparent answers achieved by operat 
ing on the data in the ways that Husaim and Cohen suggest may have 
a different meaning than they intend. For example, if subjects are 
apprehending the stimuli as integral wholes, relatable by overall sim 
ilarity, then the expectation is that all dimensions that vary in a de 
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tectable way will influence learning rate and transfer patterns since 
each discriminable dimension will contribute to the pattern of over 
all similarity relations within the stimulus set. Thus, a red square and 
an orange pentagon are less similar to one another than a red square 
is to an orange square, whether or not one presumes that the di 
mensions of color and form themselves have a separate psychologi 
cal reality. Though an investigator might be tempted to conclude 
that an infant whose categorizations are influenced by both color 
differences and form differences is paying attention to the two di 
mensions of color and form, these dimensions may be integral from 
the subject's point of view, so that differences on both dimensions 
are apprehended as a single unit. To imply that the subject is divid 
ing attention between the dimensions would be quite inappropriate. 
Likewise, calculations of the relative saliences of the dimensions, 
such as the ones that Husaim and Cohen propose, would also be mis 
leading. If the infant is only sensitive to overall similarity relations, 
still some of the experimenter-defined dimensions, as realized in the 
stimulus set, can contribute differentially to learning and transfer 
patterns—and thus be judged more salient by the proposed opera 
tions—simply because certain dimensional differences are per 
ceived as larger differences in overall similarity than others. For ex 
ample, it is likely that an orange-red square and a red-orange square 
would be more often categorized together than would an orange 
red square and an orange-red circle simply because the first two are 
more similar overall to one another than are the latter two. Thus, ev 
idence that they are so categorized does not unambiguously imply 
that the dimension of form is more salient for the learner than the 
dimension of color, a statement that implies the psychological reality 
of the dimensions for the subject. "Dimensional preferences," if 
they are reversible by manipulating within-dimension similarity, do 
not reveal any genuine psychological properties of the dimensions 
at all, but rather may constitute information about psychological re 
lations of overall similarity in the particular stimulus set. 
The foregoing remarks lead both to agreements and disagree 
ments with Husaim and Cohen's program of research. There is clear 
consensus that the laboratory study of the learning of ill-defined cat 
egories by infants, the overarching thrust of their program, is of ma 
jor significance. My reasons are these: (a) that many natural human 
concepts are organized in this way, (b) that infants are preferentially 
exposed to and learn just those concepts that are organized by 
strong family resemblance relations, and (c) that infants may be espe 
cially well-prepared to learn such categories because they are more 
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attuned to the overall similarity relations than to the dimensional re 
lations of multidimensional stimuli (and, overall similarity relations 
especially afford categories based on family resemblances). Husaim 
and Cohen explicitly mention a; would agree, I suspect, with b; but 
have given insufficient attention to c. Failing to entertain the possi 
bility that the psychological stimulus for the infant is different from 
the one declared by the experimenter—whether because it is not 
articulated into dimensions at all or because it is articulated into dif 
ferent dimensions than those the experimenter names—under 
mines the possibility of drawing strong inferences from the labora 
tory study of infant categorization. Husaim and Cohen have broken 
ground; exploration with refined tools needs to follow. 
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